In this chapter, I offer a digest of cognitive-motivational structure (CMS) theory. CMS is a way of conceptualizing character structure. Ahern and I first developed our understanding of character structure in the course of teaching and supervising the diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric patients. A patient’s CMS type is an abiding configuration of who that patient is — what kinds of issues are most important to him and how he thinks about those issues.
Initially, however, we recognized our three types of character structure by three different clusters of characteristics (Malerstein & Ahern, 1979; 1982). Only later, did we realize that the characteristics of each type derived from two fundamental parameters — the patient’s basic style of social cognition and a not entirely separate motivational focus or concern. Taking into account the two fundamental parameters, we now refer to the three types as cognitive-motivational structures, and to our theory of character structure formation as CMS theory.
It is important to understand that our use of the term social cognition refers solely to cognition involving social issues that truly matter to the person. To understand our system, it is critical to recognize that what is emotionally significant to one person may not matter to someone else.
Piaget recognized this distinction. He warned readers in the first two sentences of his foreword to The Moral Judgment of the Child that in his book they would "find no direct analysis of child morality as it is practiced in home and school life or in children’s societies. It is the moral judgment that we propose to investigate, not moral behavior or sentiments" (1965, p. 7). In CMS theory, we are concerned with behavior and sentiments, not merely with how one reasons about a social issue or with how one talks about it.
In much of psychological literature, social cognition refers to any kind of thinking that involves social issues. For example, thinking about whether city government should support a professional athletic team is regarded as social cognition. For such thinking to be regarded as social cognition, as we use the term, the issue must be emotionally significant to the person in question, and it must be likely to influence his behavior. People do not necessarily use their CMS-typical cognition when dealing with social issues that are not particularly emotionally significant to them.
We use the term motivational focus rather than motivation, because a person’s motivation may not be directly expressed. For instance, a person may shun emotional attachments. If he shuns emotional attachments, we assume that attachment is a motivational focus for him.
CMS theory is neopiagetian — that is, it benefits from Piaget’s work, extends some of his findings, and in some instances contradicts his theory.1 It extends Piaget’s stages of cognitive development in normal children into an understanding of normal character structure development. CMS theory also contradicts Piaget’s theory of the mechanisms involved in the development of social cognition, and his theory as to when the development takes place.
CMS theory connects clinical knowledge that was derived from work with adult psychiatric patients to Piaget’s understanding of cognitive development in children. Our theory of how and when CMS types are formed is consistent with my views concerning the influence of complete myelination of the corticothalamic tracts on cognition. It is also consistent with Piaget’s findings that children’s cognitive style remains uncommitted throughout the Preoperational Period, from which I infer that cognition only becomes committed sometime during the Concrete Operational Period.
Ahern and I theorized that, sometime during the Concrete Operational Period, the type of caregiving that the child experiences influences which CMS type she will adopt. We proposed that the social cognitive style of each CMS type parallels a style that is characteristic of a child in one of Piaget’s stages of cognitive development — the Concrete Operational Period, the Intuitive Phase, or the Symbolic Phase. Because of these parallels, we designated our CMS types as Operational, Intuitive, or Symbolic.
Characteristically, the Operational uses Operational social cognition and is focused on function and control of function. The Intuitive uses Intuitive social cognition and is focused on getting and having. And the Symbolic uses Symbolic social cognition and is focused on identity and attachment.
Although the person’s social cognition and motivational focus are fundamental to his CMS, most often, we recognize a person’s CMS type based on derivative characteristics. I will describe the characteristics of the Intuitive first. The Intuitive is the inverse of the Operational. Because the Symbolic is more complex than the other two types, and often is not easily discriminated from them, I will describe the Symbolic last.
The Intuitive has a heteronomous superego. Judgment of good and bad comes from outside the self. Intuitives may feel that they are good when they are in luxurious surroundings. However, sometimes, if they compare themselves to the luxurious surroundings, they may feel shabby. The point is that the Intuitive’s valuation is external, current, and almost total. An Intuitive believes in immanent justice — that you deserve what you get and get what you deserve. If a good thing happens to you, you must be good. If you are good, good things will happen to you. If a bad thing happens to you, you must be bad. If you are bad, bad things will happen to you.
However, when things go badly for Intuitives ,they are usually successful at defending themselves. Focused on current getting and having, it is not surprising that they tend to use narcissistic defenses — denial, rationalization, externalization, manipulation, conversion, and acting out. These defenses rid one of blame or shame. Rationalization justifies and denial disavows one’s idea, motive, or behavior. Externalization attributes one’s less-than-honorable idea, motive, or behavior to the outside — to something or to someone other than one’s self. Manipulation enables one to elicit behavior in another without appearing to be responsible for that behavior. In conversion and acting out one expresses ideas and motives through motor behavior without an awareness of one’s idea or motive. Conversion translates an idea into a somatic expression. For example, by becoming unable to walk, one patient expressed her idea that she could not function independently — that is, she could not stand on her own feet. The pathological prototype of the Intuitive is impulsive or narcissistic.2
Consistent with these defenses, Intuitives tend to be untrustworthy, and yet tend to distrust others. Nonetheless, because they focus on what is attractive at the moment, Intuitives may sometimes be gullible — buy the cover for the book. Intuitives incline toward action and ease of decision making, may have a taste for adventure, and may be very spontaneous. It is not unusual for them to be salespersons or managers. Intuitives may be charming, may be hail-fellow-well-met. Generally an Intuitive is responsive to her current emotions and to her current situation. An Intuitive has an eye on what’s in it for me at the moment. An Intuitive is likely to experience shame or embarrassment, but not guilt.
These defenses and inclinations are all consistent with the Intuitive’s basic motivational focus on getting and having external, narcissistic supplies — such as approbation and culturally valued possessions. Getting and having such external supplies enables the Intuitive to feel that she is good. These defenses and inclinations also involve end-stage reasoning — what looks good at the moment is good and what looks bad at the moment is bad.
Unlike the Intuitive, the Operational has an autonomous set of codes — an autonomous superego. Her momentary emotion or current situation does not readily influence these codes. Judgments or valuations are internal and abiding; take into account various dimensions; and are graded, not all-or-none. When reasoning, the Operational entertains exceptions and gradations while maintaining boundaries between social attributes. For example, to an Operational a longtime friend who was rude today is still a friend. An Intuitive may be ready to discard that friend. An Operational is not invulnerable to emotion or situation, but their impact on her valuation of her self or of another person is usually modulated. An Operational’s focus is on the rules of social life, for herself and for others. Operationals are likely to feel that they are good if they keep an obligation, and to feel guilty if they fail to do so. Operationals do not believe in immanent justice, but tend to look for antecedent causes to explain events.
Operationals tend to use obsessive defenses — undoing, intellectualization, and displacement. Undoing is a shifting back and forth in thinking about an issue — "On the one hand, I should do this; on the other hand, I should do that," diffusing the feelings involved. Intellectualization focuses on details or abstract concepts to avoid feelings. Displacement transfers emotions from the original object or situation to another. These defenses may enable an Operational to talk about taboo ideas — for example, murder or toilet functions — detached from any feelings.
The Intuitive’s defenses blur the boundaries between attributes, while the Operational’s defenses make such boundaries more precise — sometimes too much so. Unlike Intuitives and consistent with their use of obsessive defenses, Operationals tend to prefer thinking to action, may have difficulty making decisions, and may be inhibited. These defenses and tendencies are in keeping with the Operational’s basic motivational focus on function and control of function. Operationals, invested in their rules and codes, may be a bit hidebound or stodgy. They are often concerned with what is right or fair. They may be conflicted when they have to make decisions. They are more likely to be in technical work than in management or sales. Operationals tend to trust and to be trustworthy. It is out of character for Operationals to be impulsive or to get into trouble. The pathological prototype of the Operational is obsessive or phobic.
The Symbolic’s motivational focus is on identity — her sense of self — and on attachment — how emotionally close she should get to others. Symbolics regulate emotional closeness. For some Symbolics, feeling merged with another person works most comfortably and/or preserves identity. For others, the opposite — maintaining social distance works most comfortably and/or bolsters the person’s sense of who she is.
Particle-to-particle cognition is diagnostic of Symbolic CMS. One patient, when hewas ignored by a clerk, wondered if he were invisible. When he photographed a building that was subsequently demolished, he thought, depending on his mood, that he had preserved the building or that he had caused it to be destroyed. These are instances of particle-to-particle cognition — one event or quality defines an object, including the self. Symbolics blur the boundary between a thing and the representation of a thing. They may not differentiate similar and same.
If the Symbolic is a member of a group or is in a close relationship with another person, it would not be unusual for her to identify with the group or the person. Her objectives and her sense of her self might become one with theirs. Identity — distinction between the self and another person or social setting — may be blurred, rigid, or fragile. Symbolics may be drawn to cults. The pathological prototype of the Symbolic is thought disordered — that is, schizotypic or schizophrenic.
Symbolics may be subtyped. In addition to their basic social cognitive-motivational structure, Symbolics may have an Operational or an Intuitive cast to their character, or they may have some mixture of the both. Hence, the subtypes of Symbolics are: Pure, Operational, Intuitive, and Mixed. An example of an Intuitive Symbolic subtype is a woman who goes to great lengths to be adored or to be taken care of — an Intuitive focus — although her more basic motivation is to be attached — to be emotionally close — and thereby better defined. An Operational Symbolic may be significantly focused on social codes — an Operational focus. But, that focus helps her to define her self as a good person and to distinguish her self from others. Intuitives and Operationals do not have subtypes.
Because Symbolics have subtypes, they may present in many different ways. Since a Symbolic may exhibit Operational or Intuitive characteristics or both, a Symbolic’s superego may be heteronomous or autonomous. A Symbolic may use any type of defense, including a mixture of narcissistic and obsessive defenses. A person who exhibits both Operational and Intuitive characteristics is likely to be a Symbolic. One or two Symbolic characteristics trump Intuitive or Operational characteristics when it comes to categorizing a person’s CMS type; just as one hallucination or delusion outweighs much ordinary cognition when it comes to diagnosing psychosis.
Extreme characteristics of any kind may help us to recognize Symbolics. Their defenses may be obvious, brittle, or extreme. Symbolics tend toward fixity or shifts; they may be very controlled or impulsive, or they may be either at different times. They may be uncompromising in their ideals and convictions, or they may be greatly influenced by their current emotions or by the current situation. Extreme characteristics are in keeping with particle-to-particle cognition, in which a change in an attribute may change the identity of self or other.
Some people use second-order cognition to serve, or to correct for, their basic motivation or social cognition. This holds true regardless of their CMS type. For example, a fundraiser who is a Symbolic may find his sense of identity through attachment to his organization: He knows who he is and where he is going based on being part of the organization. However, he must focus on a prospective donor’s interests in order to increase his chances of getting a donation. Looking at matters from the other person’s point of view is an Operational cognitive style. Getting or having is an Intuitive motivation. Nevertheless, since the fundraiser is a Symbolic, his ultimate concern is to secure his sense of identity — his sense of self as part of the organization. He uses second-order social cognition to secure his sense of identity to avoid feeling adrift — unattached. Is this fundraiser an Intuitive Symbolic who uses second-order Operational cognition? Or is he a Pure Symbolic, who uses both second-order Operational and second-order Intuitive social cognition? It is sometimes very difficult to tell.
See Appendix A for vignettes of three subjects whom we assessed in our studies of CMS types. These vignettes describe how we recognized each subject’s CMS type. For a more complete picture of CMS types and of our theory, see Malerstein and Ahern (1982).
Ahern and I proposed that, during the Concrete Operational Period, an Operational experienced caregiving that was available and that was focused on his welfare. At that time, what his caregiver said and did became coordinated into his set of values — what is right and what is wrong — just as covariation of height and width is coordinated into his understanding of amount of juice when it is poured from one container into a wider or narrower container.
The caregiver might scold him for dawdling in the street and be patient with him as he learned to spell a word. A child in the Concrete Operational Period should be able to coordinate such unpleasant and pleasant experiences into a sense that what the caregiver says and does works out for him — that what the caregiver says and does is the good or the desirable. In regard to structure, this coordination is structurally the same as the child’s recognizing that he has as much to drink when juice is poured into a wide container even though the juice does not look like as much as he focuses on the height of the juice, or that he has the same number of candies whether they are bunched together or spread out.
If the child’s caregiver keeps her promises, is attuned to his best interests, and is available, then, on balance, he should buy into what the caregiver regards as valuable. He should develop an autonomous superego — a set of values that are not greatly affected by momentary external circumstances, including the feelings of the moment. His values are autonomous, just as his understanding of a physical attribute — for example, amount — is autonomous from a current appearance.
We proposed that, during the Concrete Operational Period, an Intuitive experienced caregiving that was unavailable, erratic, or was not particularly focused on his welfare. 3 If the caregiver is absent much of the time, if the caregiver usually says what is in the caregiver’s own interests to say, if the caregiver tends to scold the child when he is inconveniencing the caregiver, or if promises are made for the moment and may not be kept, a child in the Concrete Operational Period should be able to coordinate such experiences into a sense that he is in a self-service world. The future Intuitive senses that he had better take when the taking is good, discount words, and rely on current actions. His values are not autonomous. An Intuitive is attuned to momentary, external circumstances, just as the Intuitive-Phase child focuses on a current appearance — for example, height or spread-out.
We proposed that, during the Concrete Operational Period, a Symbolic experienced caregiving that could not be sensed as basically focused on his best interests or not focused on his best interests. He experienced caregiving that was significantly out of tune with him or with his outside world. Such a child finds that if he ignores or distorts his sense of parts of his self, or his sense of his world — a world that includes his caregiver — the caregiver becomes a better resource, or at least a more stable one. If the child shapes himself in significant ways, it works out better. For example, sometimes the child takes care of the caregiver rather than the other way around.
Once the child shapes himself appropriately, the caregiver might serve the child’s best interests quite well. We would expect this child to become an Operational Symbolic. In some cases, however, the caregiver might become more stable, but still not serve the child’s interests. We would expect that child to become an Intuitive Symbolic. Caregiving that falls somewhere between these two outcomes yields a Pure or Mixed Symbolic.
We did not think that the three CMS types were intrinsically abnormal, even though we first recognized them in psychiatric patients, and even though they differ from one another in the primitiveness of their cognitive-motivational styles. We recognized the different CMS types in ourselves, in our friends, and in people whom we read about in the news. We noted that patients of one CMS type were not necessarily more functional than patients of another type. Neither did patients of one type necessarily experience greater emotional pain or cause more pain in others. Finally, in our judgment, as our patients and those of other psychotherapists improved, some modulation of a CMS type might be evident. But the patient’s CMS type did not change into another type.
Thus, we had reasons to believe that primitive cognition and motivation, in themselves, did not equate with abnormality. Our belief was not mainstream in psychiatry, and, today, is not mainstream.
However, the work of Zusne and Jones (1982) provides support for our belief. They questioned college students on a total of 43 anomalistic beliefs. They found that a significant percentage held anomalistic beliefs, such as a belief in extraterrestrial intelligence or ESP.4 The percentage of people who hold a specific so-called anomalistic belief or engage in such a practice varies over time, but the percentage remains significant.5
When Zusne and Jones questioned students on 11 anomalistic beliefs, they found that students who held one anomalistic belief, were likely to hold others. 6 Relationships between such beliefs imply that "occult beliefs may be organized as large cognitive systems" (p. 194). I would argue that college students are at least as intelligent and informed as the general public, and that anomalistic beliefs are neither anomalistic nor attributable primarily to ignorance or stupidity.
Woolley (1997) did an extensive review of studies that reported a high frequency of these types of beliefs. She reported that neither the incidence nor the types of beliefs differed in children as compared to adults. Her discussants made two points, with which I agree. One: If such thinking is so commonplace, one should be asking why people need such thinking. Two: To assess normality by the use of logical thought is to assess humans by a type of reasoning that is new to the species and is still not commonplace.
A question may be asked. If the CMS types that use less logical cognition constitute at least half the population, which appears to be the case, how can we regard them as anomalistic or abnormal? Further, what are the implications for treatment?
These implications are addressed in Chapter 11 and in our earlier book — Psychotherapy and Character Structure (Ahern & Malerstein, 1989). If it is valid that the CMS types are not inherently abnormal, then this fact has important implications for therapeutic approaches and therapeutic goals. If the CMS types are not inherently abnormal, and if, as we believe, an adult’s CMS type is fixed, to attempt to change a patient’s CMS type is neither desirable nor possible. Further, the therapist’s approach to a patient should take into account his CMS type. Knowing a patient’s CMS type will help the therapist to understand how the patient will experience a particular approach.
1Our ideas (Malerstein and Ahern, 1982) are similar to those of Greenfield (2000), whose frame of reference was developmental psychology and culture. Greenfield believed that the stages of the Sensorimotor Period are basically universal. Roughly speaking, the sequence of Piaget’s sensorimotor stages appears to hold for the great apes as well as for humans (Parker & McKinney, 1999).
Greenfield believed that the later periods are more variable and more subject to external influence. She argued that "Piaget’s stage theory has an important universal element as a theory of innate potentials and age-dependent sensitive periods for cultural learning" (p. 231). Duringa beginning and ending age, culture may actualize an innate potential, making it more specific. "The transition from preoperations to concrete operations is a sensitive period ... that is actualized differently in different cultures." Greenfield studied a small village in Mexico. She proposed that the culture of the village subordinated cognitive function to social function. Weaving was valued based on the utility of what was woven and on "the enhancement of a girl’s marriageability by being a good weaver" (p. 256). Greenfield argued that a girl’s learning to use a backstrap loom involved concrete operations. To weave a particular pattern, the girls had to mentally transform an arrangement of threads on a device called the komen in order to transfer the threads from the komen to the loom. Although they used concrete operations in the course of weaving, they could not do a standard classification task that children readily do in cultures, such as our own culture, that, according to Greenfield, subordinates cognitive function to social function.
2 My use of the term narcissistic corresponds to the lay use of the term: being self-centered and primping, appearing to be in love with the self. The term, used in this sense, would correspond to Freud’s secondary narcissism.
3 We based our assessment of a person’s early caregiving not on his saying that his childhood was or was not a caring one, but on other kinds of clues. For example, Mrs. B in Appendix B — an Operational complained that her parents never provided any luxuries and insisted that she was going to be different with her children. Based on this statement, we thought that her parents probably saw to it that she got the necessities. An Intuitive might describe his childhood in glowing terms, but then reveal that his mother went to work when he was 7, and that no adult was home most of the time.
4 In 1974, 63 % of the students believed in extraterrestrial intelligence; 47 %, in ESP; 46 %, in UFOs; 45 %, in yoga; 39 %, in telepathy; and 39 %, in premonitions. The remaining 37 beliefs, including belief in prophetic dreams, in prophecy, in the Loch Ness Monster, in clairvoyance, and so on, were held by 36 % or less of the students.
5 Zusne and Jones found that none of their students believed in phrenology. Presumably that would have not been true 100 years ago. Gallup (1995) reported that in 1966, 34 % of those polled believed there was humanlike life on other planets, 48 % believed in UFOs, and 5 % reported that they had sighted a UFO. In 1973, these figures were 46 %, 54 %, and 11 %, respectively. Ninety percent of those polled had heard of UFOs (very high for polls), and 70 % of those who believed in life on other planets believed in UFOs. In 1978, 54 % of those polled believed in angels; over 50 % believed in UFOs and ESP; 40 % believed in devils; 25%, in astrology; and 10 %, in witches, ghosts, or legendary creatures, such as Big Foot or the Loch Ness Monster.
6 In 1976, students who believed in ghosts also held 10 other anomalistic beliefs — in UFOs, black magic, witches, necromancy, the Loch Ness Monster, astrology, reincarnation, ESP, plant ESP, and teacup reading. Students, who believed in necromancy — the belief that through communication with the dead, one can predict the future — held 9 of the 10 other beliefs. Students, who held 1 of the beliefs, other than teacup reading, held 5 or more of the others.
< Chapter 8 | Contents | Chapter 10 >
Do you have a comment or would like to open a discussion? The author would be pleased to hear from you. Contact AJ Malerstein here.